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Comments
Disabled Litigants’ Standing Issue:
Ensuring Rhode Island’s Standing
Doctrine is Accessible to ADA Tester
Litigants
Colten H. Erickson*
INTRODUCTION

Deborah Laufer is a disabled Florida resident who cannot walk
more than a few steps without an assistive device, so she makes her
way around the world with the use of a cane or wheelchair.1 She
has “limited use of her hands,” which impairs her ability to grasp
objects, and she suffers from vision impairment.2 Despite her physical limitations, Deborah has been planning a cross-country road
trip since 2019.3 Undoubtedly, such an excursion poses many obstacles for a person with limited mobility. Deborah requires accessible parking spaces close to facility entrances, and the adjacent access aisles must be wide enough for her to use a ramp to get in and

* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law,
2023. I would like to thank Professor Diana Hassel for her guidance and constitutional insight throughout the writing process. Additionally, I would like
to thank my wonderful editors, Brooke Pearsons and Amanda Reis.
1. Laufer v. Acheson Hotels, LLC, No. 2:20-CV-00344-GZS, 2021 WL
1993555, at *2 (D. Me. May 18, 2021).
2. Id.
3. Id.
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out of her vehicle.4 Anywhere she visits must provide paths connecting the accessible spaces, and those routes must be “level,
properly sloped, [and] sufficiently wide” for her to transit.5 Amenities, such as sinks and mirrors in hotels and tables in restaurants,
must be lowered so that she can reach them.6 She requires grab
bars around toilets to safely transfer on and off of them from her
wheelchair or cane.7 Even unwrapped pipes “pose a danger of
scraping or burning her legs.”8
Unfortunately, the COVID-19 pandemic has delayed Deborah’s
long-awaited road trip, but she intends to embark on her travels
once the pandemic subsides.9 That is not to say that she hasn’t kept
busy. She has been planning her lodging—and filing more than six
hundred lawsuits in fifteen states—in the meantime.10
More precisely, Deborah Laufer has been filing lawsuits
against hundreds of hotels challenging the compliance of their
online reservation systems with Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) regulations that require the disclosure of certain accessibility information for places of lodging.11 She is a self-proclaimed “advocate of the rights of similarly situated disabled persons” and “a
‘tester’ for the purpose of asserting her civil rights and monitoring,
ensuring, and determining whether places of public accommodation
and their websites are in compliance with the ADA.”12 In this context, a “tester” is an ADA-qualified disabled individual who visits
places of public accommodation with the express purpose of seeking
4. Complaint at 1–2, Laufer v. Newport Hotel Grp., LLC, No. 20-CV00422-JJM-PAS (D.R.I. Sept. 23, 2020).
5. Id. at 2.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Laufer v. Acheson Hotels, LLC, No. 2:20-CV-00344-GZS, 2021 WL
1993555, at *5 (D. Me. May 18, 2021).
10. Lotus Cannon & Minh Vu, NY Federal Judge Puts the Kibosh on 17
Reservations Website Lawsuits Filed by Same Plaintiff, JD SUPRA (July 8,
2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ny-federal-judge-puts-the-kiboshon-17-9392946/ [https://perma.cc/KLS7-P5TV]; David Sharp, Woman Files
ADA Lawsuits Across US as ‘Tester’ of Compliance, AP NEWS (Oct. 10, 2020),
https://apnews.com/article/lifestyle-us-news-travel-lawsuits-mainea8f3e01d3be1e9b94dd0c8faa59fa982 [https://perma.cc/3VX2-TE24].
11. See Sharp, supra note 10.
12. Complaint at 2, Laufer v. Newport Hotel Grp., LLC, No. 20-CV-00422JJM-PAS (D.R.I. Sept. 23, 2020).
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out and remedying ADA regulatory deficiencies through civil litigation.13 While ADA tester litigants have traditionally visited physical places of public accommodation to remedy physical barrier violations, Laufer is a tester of a different and increasingly prevalent
kind: she is a website tester seeking to remedy digital ADA noncompliance.
Laufer’s pronouncement of her tester status might cast doubt
on the veracity of her travel plans, but should it bear on the viability
of her civil rights claims? Thus far, federal courts seem to think
so—or, at least, the rate at which courts have dismissed Laufer’s
claims appears to indicate.14 Unfortunately, the logical extension
of the legal reasoning federal courts have used to dismiss Laufer’s
hotel website ADA compliance claims—namely, Article III standing
doctrine—could have a detrimental precedential effect on how
courts handle ADA tester standing generally, even in the context of
physical barrier litigation.
In 2020, Laufer filed four ADA Title III complaints in the
United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island against
places of lodging in the state.15 While each case was either voluntarily dismissed or settled before the court addressed the standing
issue, defendants’ standing challenges have succeeded in other
courts in the First Circuit.16 To encourage effective enforcement of
the ADA, Rhode Island courts should retain their statutory grant
analysis and interpret the statutory cause of action included in Title III of the ADA as a statutory grant of standing to aggrieved disabled litigants. Alternatively, Rhode Island courts should hold that
tester status does not destroy injury in fact in ADA litigation and
should interpret intent to return to the place of public accommodation broadly. These judicial determinations will help actualize the
13. Kelly Johnson, Testers Standing Up for Title III of the ADA, 59 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 683, 685 (2009).
14. See, e.g., Laufer v. Mann Hosp., LLC, 996 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 2021).
15. See generally Complaint, Laufer v. Newport Hotel Grp., LLC, No. 20CV-00422-JJM-PAS (D.R.I. Sept. 23, 2020); Complaint, Laufer v. Shanti Hosp.,
Inc., No. 20-CV-00353-MSM-PAS (D.R.I. Aug. 13, 2020); Complaint, Laufer v.
SAH Hosp., LLC, No. 20-CV-00352-MSM-PAS (D.R.I. Aug. 13, 2020); Complaint, Laufer v. Radha Krishna, LLC, No. 20-CV-00351-WES-PAS (D.R.I.
Aug. 13, 2020).
16. See, e.g., Laufer v. Acheson Hotels, LLC, No. 2:20-CV-00344-GZS, 2021
WL 1993555, at *2, *5 (D. Me. May 18, 2021). Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Puerto Rico comprise the First Circuit.
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promise of access and civil rights for Americans with disabilities
under the law that has been in effect and underenforced for more
than thirty years.
Part I of this Comment outlines the background of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the role that tester litigation plays
in its enforcement. Part II outlines federal standing doctrine,
Rhode Island standing doctrine, and the differences between the
two. Finally, Part III outlines the judicial decisions necessary to
ensure effective enforcement of the ADA in Rhode Island.
I. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND TESTER LITIGANTS

Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990
“to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities
. . . [and] clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”17 Title III
of the ADA (Title III) provides broad regulatory coverage to address
discrimination on the basis of disability in places of public accommodation.18 Title III broadly requires that “no individual shall be
discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,
or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any
person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public
accommodation.”19 While the Department of Justice may commence civil actions under Title III, enforcement has been primarily
relegated to litigation by aggrieved disabled individuals.20 However, despite the broad grant of statutory causes of action under
Title III and its enacting regulations, aggrieved individuals with
disabilities who bring civil actions under Title III are limited to recovering attorney’s fees and injunctive relief.21

17. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)–(2).
18. Johnson, supra note 13, at 692–93.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
20. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Perversity of Limited Civil Rights Remedies: The Case of “Abusive” ADA Litigation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1, 10 n.34 (2006)
(“the Department of Justice reached 107 public accommodations settlements
in ten years—’less than one settlement a month by an agency charged with
national enforcement’”) (quoting RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM 192
(2005)).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1)–(2).
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Without an avenue for recovering statutory or compensatory
damages that could make a single suit worthwhile for a disabled
person who encounters a non-compliant accessibility barrier, potential Title III litigants have little incentive to pursue civil litigation
to vindicate their rights.22 Yet, a “cottage industry” has arisen
around ADA “tester” litigation.23 Testers are ADA-qualified disabled individuals who visit places of public accommodation with the
express purpose of seeking out and remedying Title III regulatory
deficiencies through civil litigation.24 One federal court succinctly
summarized the economics of the ADA tester “cottage industry”:
The scheme is simple: an unscrupulous law firm sends a
disabled individual to as many businesses as possible, in
order to have him aggressively seek out any and all violations of the ADA. Then, rather than simply informing a
business of the violations, and attempting to remedy the
matter through “conciliation and voluntary compliance,” . . . a lawsuit is filed, requesting damage awards that
would put many of the targeted establishments out of business. Faced with the specter of costly litigation and a potentially fatal judgment against them, most businesses
quickly settle the matter.25
However “unscrupulous” the law firms filing Title III tester lawsuits might be, the net effect of the litigation is commercial-scale
enforcement of the ADA where Department of Justice enforcement
is lacking.26 As the Ninth Circuit observed in a 2008 case addressing the issue of ADA tester litigant standing, “[f]or the ADA to yield
22. See generally Ruth Colker, ADA Title III: A Fragile Compromise, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 377 (2000).
23. Rodriguez v. Investco, LLC, 305 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1280–81 (M.D. Fla.
2004).
24. Johnson, supra note 13, at 685.
25. Molski v. Mandarin Touch Rest., 347 F. Supp. 2d 860, 863 (C.D. Cal.
2004); see also Carri Becker, Private Enforcement of the Americans with Disabilities Act Via Serial Litigation: Abusive or Commendable?, 17 HASTINGS
WOMEN’S L.J. 93, 97–99 (2006).
26. Bagenstos, supra note 20, at 30 (“. . . the limited remedies [under Title
III] have led to massive underenforcement of the ADA’s public accommodations
title, and they have left serial litigation as one of the only ways to achieve anything approaching meaningful compliance with the statute.”). See generally
Johnson, supra note 13, at 723 (“Tester standing is the solution to the severe
underenforcement and continued willful violations of Title III.”).
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its promise of equal access for the disabled, it may indeed be necessary and desirable for committed individuals to bring serial litigation advancing the time when public accommodations will be compliant with the ADA.”27
Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, ADA tester litigation under a relatively innocuous provision of the ADA’s enacting regulations concerning hotel online reservation systems (ORS)
has taken federal courts by storm.28 The ORS regulation, 28 C.F.R.
§ 36.302(e)(ii), requires that:
A public accommodation that owns, leases (or leases to), or
operates a place of lodging shall, with respect to reservations made by any means, including by telephone, in-person, or through a third party . . . [i]dentify and describe accessible features in the hotels and guest rooms offered
through its reservations service in enough detail to reasonably permit individuals with disabilities to assess independently whether a given hotel or guest room meets his or
her accessibility needs.29
Seemingly, tester litigants seeking to exercise their private right of
action to enforce the ORS regulation need only visit a hotel or motel’s website and encounter a non-compliant description of ADAcompliant facilities to give rise to a cognizable claim.30 However,
disabled individuals seeking injunctive relief and attorney’s fees
under the ORS regulation in federal courts have faced a pivotal jurisdictional barrier common to physical barrier ADA tester litigants: Article III standing.31
Traditionally, ADA testers have had to clear two significant
hurdles to establish standing in federal courts: injury in fact that is
“concrete” under Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife32 and “real and

27. D’Lil v. Best W. Encina Lodge & Suites, 538 F.3d 1031, 1040 (9th Cir.
2008) (quoting Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1062 (9th
Cir. 2007)).
28. See, e.g., Laufer v. Acheson Hotels, LLC, No. 2:20-CV-00344-GZS, 2021
WL 1993555, at *2 (D. Me. May 18, 2021); Sarwar v. Om Sai, LLC, No. 2:20CV-00483-GZS, 2021 WL 1996385, at *2 (D. Me. May 18, 2021).
29. 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(e)(1), (e)(1)(ii) (2022).
30. See id.
31. See Johnson, supra note 13, at 685.
32. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).

2022]

DISABILITY RIGHTS

481

immediate” under City of Los Angeles v. Lyons.33 Recently, two U.S.
Supreme Court decisions amplifying the injury in fact requirement—Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins34 and TransUnion LLC v.
Ramirez35—threaten all ADA tester litigant standing in federal
courts.
II. FEDERAL AND RHODE ISLAND STANDING DOCTRINE

A. Article III Standing: Concrete and Particularized Injury in
Fact
The U.S. Supreme Court announced the modern analytical
framework for Article III standing in Lujan,36 in which environmental groups brought an action against the Secretary of the Interior seeking a declaration that a recently promulgated regulation
violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA).37 The ESA included a
citizen suit provision that “any person may commence a civil suit
on his own behalf (A) to enjoin any person, including the United
States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency . . .
who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this chapter.”38
The sole issue on appeal was whether the environmental groups
had standing to seek judicial review of the regulation.39 Writing for
the majority, Justice Scalia outlined three elements that constitute
the “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” under Article
III of the Constitution: injury in fact, causation, and redressability.40 The Court explained that the first prong, injury in fact, requires “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical.”41 The causation prong requires that
“there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be ‘fairly . . . trace[able] to the

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021).
Lujan, 504 U.S. 555.
Id. at 557–58.
Id. at 571–72 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)).
Id. at 558.
Id. at 560–61.
Id. at 560 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
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challenged action of the defendant.’”42 The redressability prong requires that “it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’
that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”43
Applying the injury in fact requirement to the case in Lujan,
the Court explained that the plaintiffs’ “generalized grievance” concerning government compliance with the ESA and their “some day”
intentions to visit foreign lands to observe endangered species adversely affected by the recently promulgated regulation were not
sufficiently concrete or particularized to confer Article III standing.44 The Court rejected the Eighth Circuit’s standing analysis
which concluded that because the citizen-suit provision of the ESA
created a “procedural right” to “any person,” anyone could sue to
vindicate the procedural requirements of the ESA.45 The Court
held that generalized public interest in “proper administration of
the law” cannot be “converted into an individual right by a statute
that denominates it as such, and that permits all citizens . . . to
sue,” wholly apart from any particularized harm.46
In a 1983 article, Antonin Scalia distilled the Article III standing doctrine down to one succinct question: “[w]hat is it to you?”47
As the Lujan court focused primarily on the “particularized” element of the injury in fact analysis, “most courts and scholars focused on the second part of that rude question; ‘What’s it to you?’”
48 However, after the Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in Spokeo,
Inc. v. Robins that dealt heavily in the “concrete” element of the
Lujan decision, “the focus shifted to the first part of the question:
‘what is it to you?’”49
42. Id. (quoting Simon v. E. Kentucky Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–
42 (1976)).
43. Id. at 561(quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43).
44. Id. at 564, 573–74.
45. Id. at 572–73.
46. Id. at 576-577.
47. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of
the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 882 (1983) (“The Supreme Court has described standing as “a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy.”‘ In more
pedestrian terms, it is an answer to the very first question that is sometimes
rudely asked when one person complains of another’s actions: ‘What’s it to
you?’”).
48. Richard L. Heppner Jr. Statutory Damages and Standing After Spokeo
v. Robins, 9 CONLAWNOW, 125, 128 (2018).
49. Id.
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In Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (2016), the Supreme Court addressed
the issue of whether the defendant’s alleged violations of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act’s (FCRA) procedural requirements constituted a concrete injury sufficient to satisfy the injury in fact prong
of Article III standing analysis.50 The FCRA “regulates the creation
and the use of ‘consumer report[s]’ by ‘consumer reporting
agenc[ies]’ for certain specified purposes, including credit transactions, insurance, licensing, consumer-initiated business transactions, and employment.”51 Additionally, the FCRA includes a provision for a private right of action and statutory damages of “not
less than $100 and not more than $1,000” for willful failure to comply with the Act as an alternative to actual damages.52 The plaintiff alleged that Spokeo qualified as a “consumer reporting agency”
because the company operated a service that allowed users to
search for other individuals’ “address, phone number, marital status, approximate age, occupation, hobbies, finances, shopping habits, and musical preferences.”53 The plaintiff discovered that a
search of himself on Spokeo’s website rendered entirely inaccurate
information, including that he was married, in his 50s, employed,
wealthy, and had a graduate degree.54 The plaintiff alleged that he
suffered “[imminent and ongoing] actual harm to [his] employment
prospects” as a result of the inaccurate information.55
The Court ultimately vacated and remanded the Ninth Circuit’s decision (which held that plaintiff had established Article III
standing) because it did not analyze the “concrete” and “particularized” elements independently—relying solely on the “particularize”
element to confer standing.56 The Court reasoned that “Congress
cannot erase Article III’s standing requirements by statutorily
granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have

50. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1544 (2016).
51. Id. at 1545.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A).
53. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1546.
54. Id. at 1554 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
55. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alteration in original).
56. Id. at 1550 (majority opinion); see Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409,
412 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Congress’s creation of a private cause of action to enforce
a statutory provision implies that Congress intended the enforceable provision
to create a statutory right . . . . the violation of a statutory right is usually a
sufficient injury in fact to confer standing.”).
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standing.”57 Furthermore, for the purpose of evaluating the “concreteness” requirement for an “intangible harm,” the Court explained that:
Because the doctrine of standing derives from the case-orcontroversy requirement, and because that requirement in
turn is grounded in historical practice, it is instructive to
consider whether an alleged intangible harm has a close
relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded
as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American
courts.58
The Court emphasized that a plaintiff cannot “allege a bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm, and satisfy the
injury in fact requirement of Article III.”59 In this context, a “procedural violation” is a violation of a procedural right granted by
Congress that does not necessarily constitute a concrete injury sufficient to satisfy Article III standing.60 Surprisingly, given the
length of the Court’s opinion dedicated to the meaning of “concrete
and particularized” injury and a strong implication that the majority did not believe the plaintiff satisfied the “concreteness” prong,
the Court did not address whether the plaintiff satisfied Article III
standing.61 However, the Court’s apparent trepidation didn’t last
long.
In 2021, the Supreme Court once again addressed the “concreteness” element of injury in fact in the context of statutorily created private rights of action under the FCRA in TransUnion LLC
v. Ramirez.62 At issue in the case was whether certain plaintiffs in
a large class action had standing to sue under the FCRA, which
created a statutory cause of action for certain violations concerning
reasonable procedures for reporting credit information.63
TransUnion had tagged all of the class members’ credit reports with
an alert that suggested each individual’s name matched a name on
57. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547–48.
58. Id. at 1549.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 1550 (“[plaintiff] cannot satisfy the demands of Article III by
alleging a bare procedural violation. A violation of one of the FCRA’s procedural requirements may result in no harm.”).
61. See id.
62. TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021).
63. Id. at 2203.
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a list “maintained by the U. S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of terrorists, drug traffickers, and other
serious criminals.”64 The relevant part of the decision discussed
whether class members whose credit reports TransUnion had not
transmitted to third parties had suffered a concrete injury in fact
to satisfy Article III standing. While the Court generally echoed its
prior decision in Spokeo, the Court somewhat clarified the meaning
of the Spokeo rule:
For standing purposes . . . an important difference exists
between (i) a plaintiff ‘s statutory cause of action to sue a
defendant over the defendant’s violation of federal law, and
(ii) a plaintiff’s suffering concrete harm because of the defendant’s violation of federal law. Congress may enact legal prohibitions and obligations. And Congress may create
causes of action for plaintiffs to sue defendants who violate
those legal prohibitions or obligations. But under Article
III, an injury in law is not an injury in fact. Only those
plaintiffs who have been concretely harmed by a defendant’s statutory violation may sue that private defendant
over that violation in federal court.65
The Court reasoned that the class members whose credit report had
been transmitted to third parties satisfied the Spokeo “concreteness” standard because the dissemination of the incorrect credit reporting data bore a “‘close relationship’ to a harm traditionally recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts—
namely, the reputational harm associated with the tort of defamation.”66 However, the Court held that those class members whose
credit reports TransUnion had not provided to third parties did not
suffer a concrete injury and did not establish Article III standing.
B. Applying the Spokeo and TransUnion Injury in Fact Analysis
to ADA Tester Claims
The injury in fact analysis announced in Spokeo and TransUnion has potentially devastating effects for ADA tester litigation in
federal courts—specifically in cases involving digital places of

64. Id. at 2201.
65. Id. at 2205.
66. Id. at 2208 (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016)).
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public accommodation, though not necessarily exclusively. Many
federal courts have dismissed website accessibility tester cases for
lack of concrete injury in fact in the wake of the Spokeo decision.67
While, to date, courts have only applied the Spokeo injury in fact
standard to dismiss website accessibility tester litigation, the logic
courts sometimes apply to distinguish these cases from physical
barrier Title III litigation is flimsy, if not entirely flawed. For example, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
New York explained the distinction as follows:
The injury experienced by an ADA tester plaintiff who encounters a discriminatory barrier to access at a physical location—regardless of her motivation for visiting the premises—is “concrete” because the barrier directly bars her
from “full and equal” enjoyment of the facilities on equal
footing with nondisabled individuals, and is “particularized” because it affects her in a unique, individualized way
that is not experienced by other disabled individuals who
may be aware of and offended by the premises’ violations,
but never travel to or try to access the premises . . . . By
contrast, an ADA tester who encounters a hotel ORS that
fails to comply with § 36.302(e)(1) certainly may suffer the
type of “dignitary” and “informational” injuries Plaintiff
complains of here; however, if the tester has no actual desire to use the ORS for any purpose, and the information
required by § 36.302(e)(1) has no actual specific relevance
to the tester beyond her generalized desire to find and redress ADA violations, those injuries are no more concrete
or particularized than the injuries suffered by any disabled
individual who happens to stumble across a non-compliant
website while surfing the internet from the comfort of their
home.68
In this instance, the court seems to assume that an ADA tester
plaintiff who visits a physical place of public accommodation to seek
out a Title III violation has the dual purpose of enjoying the facilities she is testing. That is not necessarily the case, particularly if
67. See, e.g., Laufer v. Mann Hosp., LLC, 996 F.3d 269, 272 (5th Cir. 2021)
(dismissing for lack of concrete injury).
68. Laufer v. Dove Hess Holdings, LLC, No. 520CV00379BKSML, 2020
WL 7974268, at *13 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2020) (citation omitted).
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the Title III plaintiff is a true “tester,” as originally contemplated
in the landmark Supreme Court decision that granted tester standing in the context of the Fair Housing Act, Havens Realty Corporation v. Coleman.69 In fact, the informational injury described in the
latter example bears a closer resemblance to the facts of Havens
than does the physical barrier example.70 In proffering such a scant
distinction between physical and digital ADA tester litigation,
courts seem to be fooled by the unsympathetic (digital barrier) trojan horse that could deprive the more sympathetic (physical barrier) tester litigant of Article III standing if courts apply the same
analysis in both situations.
C. Article III Standing: Actual or Imminent Injury in Fact
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons71 was the U.S. Supreme Court’s
touchstone for the “actual or imminent” element of the Article III
injury in fact analysis in the context of injunctive relief outlined in
Lujan.72 In Lyons, the respondent sought injunctive relief against
the use of police chokeholds “except in situations where the proposed victim of said control reasonably appears to be threatening
the immediate use of deadly force.”73 A police officer had put
Adolph Lyons, the original plaintiff, in a chokehold during a traffic
stop while he “offered no resistance or threat whatsoever.”74 The
chokehold rendered Lyons unconscious and damaged his larynx.75
Lyons alleged that:
[T]he city’s police officers, “pursuant to the authorization,
instruction and encouragement of defendant City of Los
Angeles, regularly and routinely apply these choke holds in
innumerable situations where they are not threatened by
the use of any deadly force whatsoever,” that numerous
persons have been injured as the result of the application
69. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373 (1982) (“‘[T]esters’
are individuals who, without an intent to rent or purchase a home or apartment, pose as renters or purchasers for the purpose of collecting evidence of
unlawful steering practices.”).
70. See id.
71. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
72. See generally Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
73. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 98.
74. Id. at 97.
75. Id. at 98.
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of the chokeholds, that Lyons and others similarly situated
are threatened with irreparable injury in the form of bodily
injury and loss of life, and that Lyons “justifiably fears that
any contact he has with Los Angeles police officers may result in his being choked and strangled to death without
provocation, justification or other legal excuse.”76
The Court held that a plaintiff may not seek injunctive relief “[a]bsent
a sufficient likelihood that he will again be wronged in a similar
way.”77 While Lyons had standing to claim damages against the city
and individual officers involved in the incident, he did not have standing to seek injunctive relief because he could not show “a real and immediate threat that he would again be stopped for a traffic violation,
or for any other offense, by an officer or officers who would illegally
choke him into unconsciousness without any provocation or resistance
on his part.”78 His alleged future injury was “conjectural” or “hypothetical” rather than “real and immediate” and did not satisfy Article
III standing to seek injunctive relief.79 The Court noted that “[p]ast
exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or
controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any
continuing, present adverse effects.”80
In the context of Title III litigation, the Lyons decision bears on
a plaintiff’s ability to establish standing to seek injunctive relief by
requiring the plaintiff to “demonstrate a likelihood that he will suffer future discrimination at the hands of the defendant.”81 Additionally, overarching the ADA tester standing analysis is the Lujan
Court’s comment concerning the interests of the environmental
group’s desire to “some day” visit the foreign environments to witness the wildlife: “Such ‘some day’ intentions—without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the
some day will be—do not support a finding of the ‘actual or imminent’ injury that our cases require.”82
Courts have analyzed the “likelihood of future discrimination”
issue differently in the contexts of physical and digital barrier Title
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id. at 111.
Id. at 105.
Id. at 102.
Id. (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495–96 (1974)).
Gregory v. Otac, Inc., 247 F. Supp. 2d 764, 770 (D. Md. 2003).
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992).
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III litigation. In litigation involving physical barriers, courts require a plaintiff to show an intent to return to the premises to
“demonstrate a likely future harm.”83 When assessing the plausibility of a plaintiff’s intent to return, courts weigh several factors,
including: “(1) the plaintiff’s proximity to the defendant’s place of
public accommodation; (2) the plaintiff’s past patronage; (3) the definiteness of the plaintiff’s plan to return; and (4) the plaintiff’s frequency of nearby travel.”84 However, in the context of Title III litigation involving digital barriers, courts must consider the issue of
what “intent to return” means when the digital barrier is present
wherever a plaintiff has an internet connection. Some courts have
held that a non-compliant website that reasonably deters a plaintiff
from frequenting a physical place of public accommodation is
enough to confer standing under the “actual or imminent” prong of
the Article III injury in fact requirement solely on the basis of the
deterrence—without regard to any actual intent to visit the physical premises at any future date.85 Under this analysis, “intent to
83. Norkunas v. Park Rd. Shopping Ctr., Inc., 777 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1002
(W.D.N.C. 2011) (“In order to demonstrate a likely future harm, Plaintiff must
demonstrate an intention to return to the Park Road Shopping Center.”).
84. Id.; see also, e.g., Access 4 All, Inc. v. Wintergreen Com. P’ship, Ltd.,
No. CIV.A.3:05-CV-1307-G, 2005 WL 2989307, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2005)
(“When analyzing this likelihood of return, courts have examined such factors
as: (1) the proximity of the defendant’s business to the plaintiff’s residence, (2)
the plaintiff’s past patronage of the defendant’s business, (3) the definitiveness
of the plaintiff’s plans to return, and (4) the plaintiff’s frequency of travel near
the defendant.”); D’Lil v. Stardust Vacation Club, No. CIV-S-00-1496DFL
PAN, 2001, WL 1825832, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2001) (“In determining
whether the plaintiff’s likelihood of return is sufficient to confer standing,
courts have closely examined factors such as: (1) the proximity of defendant’s
business to plaintiff’s residence, (2) the plaintiff’s past patronage of defendant’s
business, (3) the definitiveness of plaintiff’s plans to return, and (4) the plaintiff’s frequency of travel near defendant.”).
85. Laufer v. T & C Inn, LLC, No. 20-CV-3237, 2021 WL 1759263, at *5
(C.D. Ill. May 4, 2021) (denying motion to dismiss for lack of standing) (“This
threat of future injury can be shown by an intent to return to or use the public
accommodation . . . but the threat can also be shown by establishing that the
plaintiff is reasonably deterred from the accommodation because of the discrimination.”); see also Poschmann v. Fountain TN, LLC, No.
219CV359FTM99NPM, 2019 WL 4540438, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 2019)
(“Plaintiff’s ADA claim is based upon the Fountain Cottages Inn’s website failing to identify the accessible features of the motel and its rooms, in violation of
28 C.F.R. § 36.302(e)(1)(ii). Therefore, the relevant ‘future injury’ inquiry relates to the motel’s website and reservation system, rather than the motel’s
physical property.”).
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return” relates only to the plaintiff’s plausible intent to return to
the website.86 Other courts, however, have held that “when challenging ADA violations on a website, a plaintiff must allege a specific and individualized reason for accessing and using the website
in order to allege a past or future injury for standing purposes.”87
Ostensibly, intent to return to the website for the purpose of testing
its ADA compliance is not enough without an intent to use the website for the purpose of accessing the physical premises or services
offered there within.
If courts read Lyons too broadly in Title III website litigation,
the logical application of the rule to physical barrier litigation could
render Title III wholly unenforceable by true physical barrier tester
litigants. Denying standing to testers seeking to enforce ADA website regulations by requiring the plaintiff to show a purpose for accessing the website again in the future beyond testing it for ADA
compliance could open the door to denying standing to ADA testers
who visit physical places of accommodation for the sole purpose of
testing their ADA compliance. If courts require a litigant suing to
challenge a hotel website’s ADA compliance to show a purpose for
visiting the website beyond testing its compliance again in the future, would courts not also require a litigant suing to challenge a
physical premises’ ADA compliance—such as a parking space that
is too narrow or accessibility ramp that is too steep—to show a purpose for visiting the premises beyond testing its compliance? A
“purpose” requirement attached to the “intent to return” analysis

86. For readability, throughout this comment, “intent to return,” in quotations, will refer to the additional element courts require Title III plaintiffs to
satisfy to establish standing to seek injunctive relief under Lyons and its Title
III progeny. See Laufer v. T & C Inn, LLC, No. 20-CV-3237, 2021 WL 1759263,
at *4 (C.D. Ill. May 4, 2021) (“This threat of future injury can be shown by an
intent to return to or use the public accommodation”).
87. Laufer v. Dove Hess Holdings, LLC, No. 520CV00379BKSML, 2020
WL 7974268, at *11 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2020), motion to certify appeal denied,
No. 520CV00379BKSML, 2021 WL 365881 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2021). See Griffin
v. Dep’t of Lab. Fed. Credit Union, 912 F.3d 649, 656 (4th Cir. 2019) (“[Status
as an ADA tester] cannot create standing in the absence of an otherwise plausible assertion that a return to the website would allow [the plaintiff] to avail
himself of its services.”); Carello v. Aurora Policemen Credit Union, 930 F.3d
830, 834-35 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Griffin, 912 F.3d at 656) (Without “an otherwise plausible assertion that a return to the website would allow [him] to
avail himself of [the Credit Union’s] services,” Carello is no more entitled to an
injunction than any other interested citizen.).
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under the “actual or imminent” prong of Article III injury in fact
seems to defeat the intent of the Supreme Court’s decision in Havens Realty Corporation v. Coleman, which allowed for tester standing in the context of the FHA, and by proxy, tester standing generally.88
D. Existing Rhode Island Standing Doctrine
Fortunately, though the ADA is a federal statute, federal
courts are not the only available forum for Title III enforcement.
Even if an ADA tester litigant cannot establish standing in a federal court under the strict Article III standing analysis, that litigant
might still have standing in a state court because Article III standing requirements do not apply to state courts. In some instances,
the space between state and federal standing doctrine can lead to
the paradox of exclusive state-court jurisdiction over federal
claims.89 While a defendant may remove state court actions based
on federal claims to federal court if the latter has original jurisdiction over the action, where Article III standing doctrine would bar
the plaintiff’s claim, the defendant is prohibited from removing the
action from state court.90
Rhode Island courts have traditionally followed federal standing doctrine closely, but not precisely. The Rhode Island Constitution does not contain a “case and controversy” requirement to exercise judicial power.91 However, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
has made it clear that “[s]tanding is a threshold inquiry into
whether the party seeking relief is entitled to bring suit.”92 In fashioning the State’s standing analysis, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court frequently looks to federal standing doctrine and has adopted
many aspects of Article III standing. Particularly, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court has adopted the Article III injury in fact requirement, defining injury in fact by quoting Lujan directly: “an invasion
88. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 375–76, 381–82 (1982).
89. See generally Thomas B. Bennett, The Paradox of Exclusive StateCourt Jurisdiction over Federal Claims, 105 MINN. L. REV. 1211 (2021).
90. Id.
91. R.I. Ophthalmological Soc’y v. Cannon, 317 A.2d 124, 130 (R.I. 1974)
(“Unlike the United States Constitution, there is no express language in the
Rhode Island constitution which confines the exercise of our judicial power to
actual ‘cases and controversies.’”). See generally R.I. CONST. art. X.
92. Narragansett Indian Tribe v. State, 81 A.3d 1106, 1110 (R.I. 2014).
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of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”93 Furthermore, while the Rhode Island Supreme Court has
not adopted the Lyons analysis for standing to seek injunctive relief
directly, Rhode Island courts have applied a similar analysis for
evaluating standing, stating that “injuries that are prospective only
and might never occur cannot form the basis of a permanent injunction” and that “[s]urmise alone cannot afford the basis for injunctive
relief.”94
Despite Rhode Island’s standing analysis following many principles of Article III standing, it diverges from federal standing analysis in one crucial aspect: when the U.S. Supreme Court doubled
down on its injury in fact analysis in Spokeo and TransUnion, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court explicitly held the door open for statutory grants of standing devoid of injury in fact.95 On the same day
that the U.S. Supreme Court announced its TransUnion decision in
June of 2021, the Rhode Island Supreme Court announced its decision in Epic Enterprises LLC v. 10 Brown & Howard Wharf Condominium Association.96 Quoting a 2005 decision of the same court,
the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed that “[a] party acquires
standing either by suffering an injury in fact or as the beneficiary of
express statutory authority granting standing.”97
In Tanner v. Town Council of Town of East Greenwich, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that a Rhode Island
93. Pontbriand v. Sundlun, 699 A.2d 856, 862 (R.I. 1997) (“We described
our standing requirement as ‘whether the plaintiff alleges that the challenged
action has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise’ . . . . Sometimes
referred to as the ‘injury in fact’ requirement . . . .”) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
94. R.I. Tpk. & Bridge Auth. v. Cohen, 433 A.2d 179, 182, 184 (R.I. 1981);
see Boyer v. Bedrosian, 57 A.3d 259, 271 n.27 (R.I. 2012) (quoting Los Angeles
v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (“[P]ast exposure to harm will not, in and of itself,
confer standing upon a litigant to obtain equitable relief ‘[a]bsent a sufficient
likelihood that he will again be wronged in a similar way.’”); Di Chiara v. Town
Council, Town of Johnston, No. P.C. 87-0728, 1987 WL 859814, at *2 (R.I. Super. Apr. 24, 1987) (citing Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983)) (“[I]n order
for injury to be irreparable it must be presently threatened or imminent and
not merely speculative or past harm never capable of occurring again.”).
95. See Epic Enters. LLC v. 10 Brown & Howard Wharf Condo. Ass’n, 253
A.3d 383 (R.I. 2021).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 388 (emphasis added) (quoting Tanner v. Town Council of Town
of E. Greenwich, 880 A.2d 784, 792 (R.I. 2005)).

2022]

DISABILITY RIGHTS

493

statute requiring certain public notices for meetings of public bodies
provided a statutory grant of standing devoid of injury in fact.98
The statute broadly stated that “[a]ny citizen or entity of the state
who is aggrieved as a result of violations of the provisions of this
chapter may file a complaint with the attorney general.”99 The
court explained that “in statutory standing cases, such as this, the
analysis consists of a straight statutory construction of the relevant
statute to determine upon whom the Legislature conferred standing and whether the claimant in question falls in that category.”
After determining that the purpose of the statutes was to “protect
the public’s right to participate in the political process,” the court
held that the plaintiff, who was merely a resident of the defendant
town, did not need “to possess a personal stake or interest in the
substance of the meeting to assert a right to attend a meeting of a
public body.”100
Therefore, at present, plaintiffs may establish standing in
Rhode Island courts by either satisfying the injury in fact analysis
common to Rhode Island and federal standing doctrine or establishing that the plaintiff is “the beneficiary of express statutory authority granting standing.”101 However, plaintiffs seeking injunctive
relief in Rhode Island courts must still satisfy an “imminency” element similar to the federal standing analysis under Lyons.
Namely, the alleged injury cannot be “prospective only” and uncertain to occur.102
III. ENSURING RHODE ISLAND STANDING DOCTRINE IS ACCESSIBLE TO
ADA TESTER LITIGANTS

The Rhode Island Supreme Court has only heard one Title III
case since the ADA came into effect in 1990, but the court did not
address the issue of standing in that case.103 Therefore, the question of ADA tester litigant standing is still an open question in
98. Tanner, 880 A.2d at 792–93.
99. Id. at 792.
100. Id. at 792 n.6.
101. Epic Enters. LLC v. 10 Brown & Howard Wharf Condo. Ass’n, 253 A.3d
383, 388 (R.I. 2021) (emphasis added) (quoting Tanner v. Town Council of
Town of E. Greenwich, 880 A.2d 784, 792 (R.I. 2005)).
102. R.I. Tpk. & Bridge Auth. v. Cohen, 433 A.2d 179, 182 (R.I. 1981).
103. Marques v. Harvard Pilgrim Healthcare of New Eng., Inc., 883 A.2d
742 (R.I. 2005).
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Rhode Island courts. In the wake of the federal standing doctrine
the U.S. Supreme Court expounded upon in Spokeo and TransUnion, cases involving Title III website litigation could be coming to
Rhode Island state courts as the U.S. District Court for the District
of Rhode Island dismisses them for lack of standing. To guarantee
standing for physical barrier litigation, and to prevent the extension of the restrictive standing analysis federal courts have employed to dismiss website tester litigation, Rhode Island courts
should bulwark ADA tester standing in website litigation to ensure
access for all disability litigation in Rhode Island.
A. Rhode Island Courts Should Reject the Strict Federal
Spokeo/TransUnion Standing Analysis and Retain Rhode Island’s
Existing Statutory Grant Analysis
While the Rhode Island Supreme Court has traditionally adhered closely to federal standing analysis trends, the court should
reject the U.S. Supreme Court’s restrictive standing analysis espoused in Spokeo and TransUnion that specifically foreclosed Congress’s ability to grant standing to litigants for injuries not closely
related to traditional causes of action under common law.104 As
previously discussed, Rhode Island courts are not bound by Article
III standing analysis. Additionally, Rhode Island courts are not restricted by any “case and controversy” requirement in the Rhode
Island Constitution to exercise judicial power.105 To give effect to
the ADA—and statutory civil rights litigation that does not bear a
close relationship to traditional causes of action under common law
generally—the Rhode Island Supreme Court should retain its existing standing analysis that includes an avenue for statutory
grants of standing devoid of concrete injury in fact.106
However, the U.S. Supreme Court’s exclusion of statutory
grants of standing, and the argument for amending Rhode Island
standing doctrine in accordance, is not without merit. If the Rhode
104. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2205 (2021); Spokeo,
Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).
105. R.I. Ophthalmological Soc’y v. Cannon, 317 A.2d 124, 130 (R.I. 1974);
see R.I. CONST. art. X.
106. See Epic Enters. LLC, 253 A.3d at 383 (R.I. 2021); Tanner v. Town
Council of Town of E. Greenwich, 880 A.2d 784, 792 (R.I. 2005) (“A party acquires standing either by suffering an injury in fact or as the beneficiary of
express statutory authority granting standing.”).
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Island Supreme Court does not rid its existing standing doctrine of
the statutory grant analysis, it could open the door to a flood of lawsuits claiming to proceed under the authority of statutory grants
from Congress that no longer have Article III standing under the
recently bolstered “concreteness” element pronounced in Spokeo
and TransUnion. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court in Spokeo
proposed the hypothetical in which a credit reporting agency harmlessly misstates an individual’s zip code.107 Under a statutory
grant analysis, an individual who discovers that a credit reporting
agency misstated her zip code could sue the credit reporting agency
under the FRCP’s statutory grant of standing and recover statutory
damages of $100 to $1000 for each violation, regardless of any injury or inconvenience to the plaintiff caused by the incorrect zip
code.108
To the extent that some might find this result unpalatable, it
should be noted that Congress drafted the law in such a way that
allows for this result under a strict statutory grant analysis framework. The U.S. Supreme Court itself commented in Spokeo that
“Congress is well positioned to identify intangible harms that meet
minimum Article III requirements.”109 However, as the Court went
on to explain, under the “concreteness” element of Article III injury
in fact analysis, “it is instructive to consider whether an alleged intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or
American courts.”110 For a state contemplating whether to undo its
statutory grant standing analysis, it should also be instructive to
consider where the U.S. Supreme Court’s standing analysis leaves
statutory civil rights litigation generally. What common law cause
of action is closely related to the statutorily created private rights
of action under the Civil Rights Act of 1964? Or, more directly, what
common law cause of action is closely related to any statutorily created private right of action under Title III (physical barrier or otherwise)? In TransUnion, Justice Thomas, dissenting, highlighted
107. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550 (2016) (“[N]ot all inaccuracies cause harm
or present any material risk of harm. An example that comes readily to mind
is an incorrect zip code. It is difficult to imagine how the dissemination of an
incorrect zip code, without more, could work any concrete harm.”).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a).
109. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1543.
110. Id. at 1549.
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the absurdity of the majority’s decision regarding statutorily created private rights of action:
No matter if the right is personal or if the legislature deems
the right worthy of legal protection, legislatures are constitutionally unable to offer the protection of the federal
courts for anything other than money, bodily integrity, and
anything else that this Court thinks looks close enough to
rights existing at common law . . . . The 1970s injury-infact theory has now displaced the traditional gateway into
federal courts.111
While $100 to $1000 in statutory damages for every FCRA violation
may seem untenable, Congress deemed such the appropriate remedy
for violations of the private rights it created under the Act.112 To allow
for effective enforcement of legislatively recognized private rights generally, and private rights recognized under Title III specifically, Rhode
Island should retain its statutory grant standing analysis.

B. Rhode Island Courts Should Interpret the ADA as Providing a
Statutory Grant of Standing
Rhode Island courts should interpret the statutory language of
Title III as a grant of standing to disabled litigants. In cases of
standing by statutory grant, Rhode Island courts use statutory interpretation to determine whether a statute confers standing to a
particular plaintiff.113 The statutory language at issue in Title III
reads as follows:
The remedies and procedures set forth in section 2000a3(a) of this title are the remedies and procedures this subchapter provides to any person who is being subjected to
discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of this
subchapter.114

111. TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2221 (2021) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
112. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a).
113. Tanner v. Town Council of Town of E. Greenwich, 880 A.2d 784, 793
(R.I. 2005) (“In statutory standing cases, such as this, the analysis consists of
a straight statutory construction of the relevant statute to determine upon
whom the Legislature conferred standing and whether the claimant in question falls in that category.”). Id. at 792 n.6.
114. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) (emphasis added).
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Similar to the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s analysis in Tanner v.
Town Council of Town of East Greenwich, where the court held that
the statutory language, “[a]ny citizen . . . who is aggrieved,” conferred
standing to the plaintiff, Rhode Island courts should interpret the “any
person” language provided in Title III as a statutory grant of standing
to disabled individuals who seek to enforce the ADA.115 Nothing in
Title III’s statutory grant suggests that the grant does not apply
equally to tester litigants,116 and Congress drafted Title III to closely
mirror the FHA eight years after the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
FHA conferred standing to tester litigants.117
To the extent that federal courts could dismiss an ADA tester
litigant’s suit for lack of injury in fact under the Spokeo/TransUnion
analysis when a plaintiff merely tests a physical or digital place of
public accommodation for ADA compliance, as the Rhode Island Supreme Court held in Tanner, when a litigant is the beneficiary of a
statutory grant of standing, the litigant need not suffer any concrete injury.118 Therefore, a tester litigant seeking to enforce the
ADA’s lodging website regulation need not have any particular utility for the absent statutorily required information. All that Rhode
Island courts should require litigants to show to confer statutory
standing under Title III is that 1) the litigant is an ADA-qualified
disabled individual as defined under 42 U.S.C. § 12102, and 2) the
litigant has been discriminated against on the basis of her disability
as defined by Title III under 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2) and its enacting regulations.
Applied to the general facts of Deborah Laufer’s serial litigation, a Rhode Island court that interprets Title III as a statutory
grant of standing would hold that Laufer has standing to pursue
her lodging website tester litigation. Laufer, who is vision impaired
and bound to a wheelchair or cane, is certainly a disabled individual

115. Tanner, 880 A.2d at 792.
116. See 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1).
117. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
118. See Tanner, 880 A.2d at 792–93 (“the statutory requirement that an
individual be ‘aggrieved’ by a violation of the OMA does not require that a
plaintiff allege some harm to his or her economic or property interests, but
rather that his or her right to be ‘advised of and aware of’ the performance,
deliberations, and decisions of government entities was, or may be, violated.”).
Id. at 793.
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as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102.119 Based on her pleadings, the
hotel defendants she has sued have discriminated against her
based on her disability because their booking websites have not provided adequate information regarding the hotels’ accessibility accommodations in accordance with 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(e)(ii). If Rhode
Island courts retain the statutory grant route to establishing standing, and if the courts interpret Title III as providing a statutory
grant, then Laufer and other similarly situated ADA tester litigants
will have standing in Rhode Island courts.
C. Alternatively, Rhode Island Courts Should Hold that Tester
Status Does Not Destroy Injury in Fact in ADA Litigation
Alternatively, Rhode Island courts should hold that disabled
individuals who encounter ADA non-compliant barriers, physical or
digital, have suffered an injury in fact sufficient to satisfy Rhode
Island’s standing doctrine regardless of the litigant’s status as a
tester. Rhode Island courts should look to Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman, in which the U.S. Supreme Court originally granted
tester standing in the context of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) under
the federal injury in fact framework.120 The statute at issue in Havens, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d), states that it is “unlawful . . . [t]o represent to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or
rental when such dwelling is in fact so available.”121 The Court
reasoned that:
A tester who has been the object of a misrepresentation . . .
has suffered injury in precisely the form the statute was
intended to guard against, and therefore has standing to
maintain a claim for damages under the Act’s provisions.
That the tester may have approached the real estate agent
fully expecting that he would receive false information, and
without any intention of buying or renting a home, does not
negate the simple fact of injury within the meaning of [42
U.S.C. § 3604(d)].122
119. See Complaint at 1–2, Laufer v. Newport Hotel Group, LLC, No. 20CV-00422-JJM-PAS (D.R.I. Sept. 23, 2020).
120. See generally Havens, 455 U.S. 363.
121. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (emphasis added).
122. Havens, 455 U.S. at 373–74.
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As the U.S. Supreme Court held in Havens regarding FHA tester
litigants, Rhode Island courts should not deprive litigants of standing based on their tester status. Tester litigants seeking to enforce
physical barrier regulations may be “discriminated against on the
basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations”123 regardless of their purpose for visiting a physical place of public accommodation. Correspondingly, tester litigants seeking to enforce
ADA lodging website regulations under 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(e)(ii)
may be discriminated against based on their disability, regardless
of their purpose for visiting the website.
Similar to the FHA tester litigants in Havens, whom the U.S.
Supreme Court held had a statutory right to accurate information
regarding the availability of housing rental information irrespective of their intent to rent, Deborah Laufer has a right to ADA compliant accessibility information regarding a hotel’s disability accommodations, regardless of whether she has an actual intent to stay
at a particular hotel. The ADA’s ORS regulation requires that hotels’ online reservation systems “[i]dentify and describe accessible
features in the hotels and guest rooms offered through its reservations service in enough detail to reasonably permit individuals with
disabilities to assess independently whether a given hotel or guest
room meets his or her accessibility needs.”124 Logically, the duty to
provide information regarding accessibility accommodations arises
before an ADA-qualified litigant determines whether to rent a room
at the place of lodging in question. Therefore, a “concrete and particularized” informational injury occurs when the would-be renter
seeks, but is not provided, the accessibility information she has a
statutory right to before an intent to book a reservation arises. To
hold otherwise would deprive physical barrier tester litigants
standing in Rhode Island courts if they could not prove that they
intended to enjoy the “full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of” a
place of public accommodation.125
While the deprivation of standing might seem tempting in the
unsympathetic serial litigant website case, if courts impute an
123. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
124. 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(e)(ii) (2022).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
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intent requirement into its injury in fact analysis, the precedent
could prevent the physical barrier ADA tester litigant from establishing standing in Rhode Island courts. Despite the weight of federal authority to the contrary regarding website ADA litigation, in
Rhode Island, the informational injury Laufer suffers as a result of
non-compliant hotel websites should be enough to satisfy Rhode Island injury in fact analysis, even if the courts do not interpret Title
III as a statutory grant of standing.
D. Rhode Island Courts Should Loosely Interpret the “Intent to
Return” Requirement for Injunctive Relief in the Context of ADA
Litigation if Analyzing Under the Injury in Fact Prong
Under the injury in fact route to establishing standing, to the
extent that Rhode Island courts apply a Lyons-like analysis for injunctive relief standing, Rhode Island courts should loosely interpret “intent to return.”126 Plainly, Rhode Island courts should only
require an intent to return to the place of public accommodation or
website without regard to the plaintiff’s purpose for doing so. While
Rhode Island courts will not grant injunctive relief standing for “injuries that are prospective only and might never occur,”127 legitimate ADA tester litigants have already encountered the non-compliant physical or digital barrier and need only return to the place
of public accommodation to encounter the barrier again. In Title
III litigation, the likelihood of a litigant encountering a specific noncompliant barrier again is not as attenuated as the Lyons plaintiff’s
risk of being illegally placed in a chokehold by police without provocation128 or the Lujan plaintiffs’ “some day” intentions to visit far
away, foreign lands to observe certain endangered species.129
Furthermore, the statutory language of Title III itself casts into
doubt the applicability of the “intent to return” requirement in Title

126. See Norkunas v. Park Rd. Shopping Ctr., Inc., 777 F. Supp. 2d 998,
1001 (W.D.N.C. 2011) (“In order to demonstrate a likely future harm, Plaintiff
must demonstrate an intention to return to the Park Road Shopping Center.”);
Boyer v. Bedrosian, 57 A.3d 259, 271 n.27 (R.I. 2012) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (“[P]ast exposure to harm will not, in and of
itself, confer standing upon a litigant to obtain equitable relief ‘[a]bsent a sufficient likelihood that he will again be wronged in a similar way.’”).
127. R.I. Tpk. & Bridge Auth. v. Cohen, 433 A.2d 179, 182, 184 (R.I. 1981).
128. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983).
129. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992).
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III litigation. A provision in 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) explicitly specifies that “[n]othing in this section shall require a person with a
disability to engage in a futile gesture if such person has actual notice that a person or organization covered by this subchapter does
not intend to comply with its provisions.”130 If the “futile gesture”
provision is to have any effect, it is that the tester litigant need not
plead a concrete plan to return to a place of public accommodation
if she has “actual knowledge” that the accommodation is not ADA
compliant.131
In the context of online reservation systems, Rhode Island
courts should analyze the intent to return to the website as just
that—intent to visit the website—without regard to the analytically
separate element of purpose for doing so. As noted above, the informational injury arises before an ADA-qualified litigant determines whether to rent a room. Therefore, Rhode Island courts
should confine their “intent to return” analysis to the intent to return to the place of injury—the website—regardless of any intent
to make a reservation therein. Once again, the “futile gesture” exception provided in 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) supports the proposition
that an ADA tester litigant need not plead an intent to return to a
place of accommodation for the purpose of “full and equal enjoyment
of the . . . facilities”132 if the litigant has “actual notice that a person
or organization . . . does not intend to comply with” the requirements of the ADA.
E. Adverse Impact on Small Business
Opponents of serial Title III litigation object that the litigation
is harmful to small businesses.133 Frankly, it is difficult for a small
business to ensure it is in compliance due to the ADA’s extensive
regulations for places of public accommodation.134 A small business
130. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) (emphasis added).
131. See id.
132. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
133. See Becker, supra note 25, at 109–12 (2006); Lauren Markham, The
Man Who Filed More Than 180 Disability Lawsuits: Is it Profiteering – or Justice?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 29, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/21/magazine/americans-with-disabilitiesact.html [https://perma.cc/C7TP-T39N].
134. Becker, supra note 25, at 99 (“One of the major problems with the ADA
is how easy it is to be out of compliance: a single bathroom must meet at least
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that is caught with even the smallest infraction can find itself on
the hook for thousands of dollars in attorney’s fees.135 On occasion,
a Title III suit may force a small business to close its doors permanently.136 However, widespread ADA non-compliance is a product
of three decades of underenforcement of the essential civil rights
statute.137 Broad Title III enforcement in Rhode Island courts is
bad for small businesses that are not in compliance with the ADA
and are, therefore, at least passively, discriminating on the basis of
disability. Furthermore, Title III does not require that businesses
incur excessive expense to provide the most accessible services conceivable, but only requires “reasonable modifications in policies,
practices, or procedures,” and removal of architectural barriers
“where such removal is readily achievable.”138
While it is regrettable that Congress did not provide a notification requirement or cure period for defendants before plaintiffs can
litigate the merits of their claims, as the law stands today, Title III
private litigant suits are the best tool available to achieve greater
accessibility in Rhode Island for disabled individuals.139 Over time
and undoubtedly hundreds of ADA tester lawsuits, businesses of all
sizes will recognize that strict ADA compliance is mandatory, and
95 different standards from the height of the toilet paper dispenser to the exact
placement of handrails. Even through good faith efforts, such as hiring an
ADA compliance expert, a business can still find itself subject to a lawsuit for
the most minor and unintentional of infractions, such as telephone volume controls needing adjustment. In fact, it is estimated that less than 2% of public
buildings nationwide are in full compliance of the ADA.”).
135. See Molski v. Mandarin Touch Rest., 347 F. Supp. 2d 860, 863 (C.D.
Cal. 2004).
136. See Markham, supra note 133.
137. Jasmine Harris & Karen Tani, Debunking Disability Enforcement
Myths,
REGUL.
REV.
(Oct.
25,
2021),
https://www.theregreview.org/2021/10/25/harris-tani-debunking-disability-enforcement-myths
[https://perma.cc/SKN8-JXDR] (“Notwithstanding the evidence of congressional intent, and notwithstanding decades of evidence that the ADA is significantly underenforced, popular narratives cast ADA litigation as inherently
suspect.”); see NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, NATIONAL DISABILITY POLICY: A
PROGRESS REPORT 92 (2018) (“The nation cannot be content for full integration
and equal rights for all people with disabilities to remain simply aspirational.);
NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, NATIONAL DISABILITY POLICY: A PROGRESS
REPORT 95 (2015) (“Although youth and young adults with disabilities were
born into a post-ADA environment, far too many have not experienced the civil
rights for equitable access that federal legislation was enacted to protect.”).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (emphasis added).
139. See generally Bagenstos, supra note 20.
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the result will be greater accessibility and compliance. Once again,
as the Ninth Circuit observed, “[f]or the ADA to yield its promise of
equal access for the disabled, it may indeed be necessary and desirable for committed individuals to bring serial litigation advancing
the time when public accommodations will be compliant with the
ADA.”140 Rhode Island courts should not deny disabled individuals’
civil rights for the sake of avoiding harm to businesses that discriminate on the basis of disability by failing to make reasonable modifications to their premises and services in accordance with Title III.
CONCLUSION

Deborah Laufer is not a sympathetic plaintiff. The hundreds
of lawsuits she has filed cast doubt on the veracity of her complaints, and she stands to profit on the scheme. However, ADA
testers like Laufer, both in the physical and digital realm, provide
necessary enforcement of the historically under enforced civil rights
statute enacted by Congress in 1990. However unlikely Laufer’s
alleged road trip seems, the precedent set by dismissing the lawsuits of similarly situated individuals in Rhode Island courts for
lack of standing could deny standing to physical barrier ADA tester
litigants.
ADA tester litigation is a crucial tool for disabled Americans
seeking to enforce their civil rights. While ADA tester standing is
under assault in the federal courts, Rhode Island courts are not
bound by the standing requirements of Article III of the U.S. Constitution. To protect the civil rights of disabled Rhode Islanders
and those wishing to visit the state, Rhode Island courts should ensure ADA testers can satisfy Rhode Island standing doctrine and
enforce their rights under Title III by retaining its statutory grant
analysis and interpreting Title III as a statutory grant of standing.
Alternatively, Rhode Island courts should hold that tester status
does not destroy injury in fact and loosely interpret the intent to
return requirement for injunctive relief in the context of Title III
litigation.
The protection of ADA tester litigant standing will permit effective enforcement of Title III and help actualize the promise of
140. See D’Lil v. Best W. Encina Lodge & Suites, 538 F.3d 1031, 1040 (9th
Cir. 2008) (quoting Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1062
(9th Cir. 2007)).
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access and civil rights for Americans with disabilities. In the words
of Albert Dytch, a frequent ADA tester litigant and the subject of a
recent New York Times Magazine article,141 “[t]he civil rights of
those with disabilities are violated every time they’re denied the
same benefits and privileges as the able-bodied. Yet relatively few
have the time, energy, courage, and fortitude to insist that these
rights are honored and protected in accordance with the law.”142
More than thirty years after Congress enacted the ADA, to ensure
a more accessible and inclusive state, Rhode Island courts should
recognize tester litigants’ important function as the primary enforcers of Title III and guarantee that the state’s standing doctrine is
accessible to disabled individuals seeking to assert their civil rights.

141. Markham, supra note 133.
142. Albert Dytch, The View from a Wheelchair, ACCESSIBLE NOW, https://accessiblenow.net [https://perma.cc/6PZG-NSDA] (last visited Jan. 15, 2022).

